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ABSTRACT 
In many  countries  firms  can  choose whether to  report  a revaluation  in the financial  statements.  Besides 
contracting costs, signalling can determine the decision to revalue assets.  An analytical model is developed 
which allows us to indicate conditions in which it is more likely that successful firms will not revalue assets 
as  a credible signal to  potential investors of their success. These industry settings include a high variance in 
success and low equity-to-debt ratios.  The empirical results,  using Belgian data,  confirm that besides the 
classical contracting effects, successful firms are less likely to revalue assets in those industries with a high 
variance  in  performance  or with low  equity-to-debt ratios.  As  firms  move closer to  technical default or 
violate covenants, and as they are larger, they are more likely to revalue assets. Further, the results support 
the choice to revalue, but not the amount of revaluation, as a signalling device. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting laws in many countries such as the UK, Australia and Belgium, allow 
for the revaluation of tangible fixed and financial assets in the annual accounts. Managers 
have the discretionary power whether or not to report a revaluation of assets. Taking into 
account the true and fair view of the financial statements, also the amount of revaluation 
disclosed in  the financial  statements is  a choice variable.  Previous  accounting  studies 
(Brown, Izan and Loh , 1992; Whittred and Chan,  1992; Peasnell,  1994) concentrate on 
contractual relationships to explain the decision to revalue assets or not. Highly leveraged 
firms, which are close to, and want to avoid, the default on their debt covenants are more 
likely to revalue assets. In these empirical studies firms, which revalue assets are found to 
be larger, have larger property holdings and low market-to-book values. The signalling 
motive for revaluing assets is  still a less examined issue.  Peasnell (1994) proposes the 
hypothesis that revaluation of assets is a positive signal because it results in a decrease in 
the return on equity.  Only when firms  have positive inside information and  shares are 
undervalued, they will be prepared to carry the costs of a decrease in the return on equity. 
This  hypothesis  was  not confirmed by  the  empirical  evidence.  Further  studies  which 
analysed the abnormal returns on the stock exchange after a revaluation of assets yielded 
mixed results (Easton, Eddey and Harris, 1993; Standish and Dng, 1982; Emanue1,1989). 
This  paper  is  the  first  to  develop  and  test  an  analytical  model  studying  the 
signalling function of the revaluation decision. The environment which is modelled is one 
where the financial position of a company determines the probability of raising funds for 
new investments, while at the same time affecting the probability of reorganisation. The 
revaluation of assets is  found  to  be a  negative  signal.  Poorly performing firms  benefit 
more from revaluing assets. Since these firms have a smaller net worth, they have a larger 
probability of violating the legal requirements with respect to  the net worth. As the net 
worth increases by revaluing the assets, badly performing firms face a larger decrease in 
expected reorganisation costs due to revaluation.  However, in a world of incompletely 
informed  investors,  as  the  return  on  equity  decreases,  poorly  performing  firms  who 
revalue,  will  have  more  difficulty  attracting  new  funds.  If investors  believe  that  the 
revaluation of assets is a negative signal, then it is less likely that funds will be provided 
or they will be provided only at a higher cost. This results in a decrease in the expected 
cash flows of the project. Because successful firms realise larger cash flows, the increase 
in the expected cash flows from not revaluing is larger for these firms, while at the same 3 
time  the  increase in expected reorganisation costs  from  not revaluing is  lower.  As  a 
consequence, not revaluing assets can be a powerful mechanism used by the successful 
firms  to  signal  their  success,  their  higher  cash  flows.  Industry  characteristics  most 
favourable for signalling are shown to be a high variance in performance and low equity-
to-debt ratios. 
These analytical insights are empirically tested using Belgian data.  The results 
confirm the signalling hypothesis that in industries with a high variance in performance 
and lower equity-to-debt ratios, successful firms are more likely not to revalue assets. The 
impact  of other  traditionally  considered  contractual  relationships  on  the  decision  to 
revalue assets is also ascertained. Firms are more likely to revalue assets as their financial 
position is weaker and if the firm size is larger. 
The paper is organised as follows.  In section 2 the institutional environment is 
described. In section 3 the signalling model is developed.  Univariate and multivariate 
tests  are  presented  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  section  4.  Section  5  closes  with 
conclusions. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
In  Belgium  the  accounting  law  allows  the  revaluation  of fixed  tangible  and 
financial assets.  Firms may revalue assets when the economic value of the fixed tangible 
assets determined on the basis of their use by the firm is  permanently larger than their 
book value. Since no precise rules are prescribed for the revaluation of assets, managers 
can  exercise  discretion whether or not to  report  an  increase in  the  book  value of the 
assets. The revaluation of fixed assets is even more discretionary than the revaluation of 
financial assets. If the firms,  which are controlled, do not realise profits or distribute all 
profits, the book value of financial assets can not be increased. 
The revaluation of assets results in increases of the fixed assets and the 
revaluation reserve, which is part of the owner's equity (Art. 34 Royal decree October 8 
1976). If firms revalue fixed tangible assets, the revalued assets must be depreciated over 
their  remaining  life.  Hence,  the  revaluation  of fixed  assets  results  in  a  decrease  in 
accounting profits for the period. Nevertheless, depreciation of the revalued amounts is 
not allowed by the tax authorities (Art. 24, Fiscal Law, Art. 44,  1°). Consequently, taxes 
can never be the reason for revaluing assets. However, some legal requirements can be 
more easily met by revaluing assets (Company Law, Article 77bis,  103  and 104). Also, 4 
dividends can be distributed earlier, since a firm can only distribute profits when the net 
worth, defined as  [total assets -total liabilities - value of the intangible assets - value of 
the set up costs], is larger than the value of capital and the unavailable reserves (Art. 77 
bis  Company Law).  If a firm  revalues  assets,  this  requirement is  more easily met and 
profits can be more readily distributed.  In addition, if the  net worth,  defined as  [total 
assets -total liabilities], is smaller than half of the capital, the general board of the firm 
has to  decide whether to  develop a reorganisation plan or end the activities of the firm 
(Art  103  &104 Company Law). If the net worth is  smaller than the minimum level of 
capital,  every  related  part  (auditor,  debt  holders,  owners,  banks  ... )  can  demand 
bankruptcy. 
The next section develops an analytical model to explain revaluation of assets as 
a  signalling device,  taking into  account the  institutional  framework in  which  Belgian 
firms  operate.  Additionally,  in  Belgium  most  firms  are  not  widely  held,  therefore 
revaluation of assets is studied in an environment without a stock market.  This implies 
that only the book value of the shares is available. 
3. THE MODEL 
As in the typical signalling models of corporate investment (cf. e.g.  Meyers & 
Majluf,  1984),  the  signalling party is  a firm  needing capital  to  finance  a new project, 
which generates either high or low cash flows. The receiving party is a potential investor, 
uninformed  on  the  expected  success  of the  project.  After  receiving  the  signal,  i.e. 
observing whether or not the firm revalues its assets, investors decide on whether or not 
to invest.  The signalling function of asset revaluation is studied in an environment, where 
the  current  financial  position  and  the  expected  success  of the  project  determine  the 
probability  of raising  funds  for  an  investment  I.  As  the  current  financial  position 
improves, investors have more confidence in the firm,  and the funds can be more easily 
raised while at the same time the probability of a reorganisation drops. 
The probability of not raising the funds given a fixed equity/debt ratio equals: 
where: 
I  Alternatively, instead of the probability of raising  funds, the beliefs of the investors can be modelled to 
influence the price/interest rate paid for the investment funds, yielding similar conclusions. 




the probability that the money can not be raised given investors believe 
that the firm realises St as cash flows 
the cash flows from the project as perceived by the investors. 
Two possible types t are considered: SH (high cash flows) 
or SL (low cash flows). 
a constant parameter, reflecting the general economic situation; 
the amount of equity before revaluation as a share of total debt. 
The  equity-to-debt  ratio  IS  similar  for  both  types  of  firms  and  common 
knowledge.  The higher E/D, the lower the probability of not raising funds.  In a complete 
information environment the amount of revaluation does not influence the probability of 
raising  the  funds  for  the  project.  In  an  incomplete  information  environment  it does 
because the revaluation decision determines the beliefs of the investors on the success of 
the firm St. 
Firms face a probability that they have to layoff employees, rearrange activities, 
etc,. which typically involve reorganisation costs.  The probability of a reorganisation is 
smaller when funds for the new project are obtained and when the financial position is 
better. The probability of a reorganisation can be expressed as: 
where: 
re/f (  R)  P  t  Sl>  :  the probability that a reorganisation is needed given that funds 
are acquired 
cash flows from the project for firms of type t with t=H, L 
the amount of revaluation, which varies between 0 and M; 
a constant term. 
(2a) 
Given that cash flows are only realised when funds can be obtained, we also need 
to define the probability of reorganisation in case of no funds: 
p relnf (R)=exp-b«E+R)/D)  (2b) 
The amount of revaluation varies between 0 and M,  where M is the maximum 
amount allowed by a true and fair view in the financial  statements. The total expected 
reorganisation costs, TER, are not only determined by the probability of a reorganisation 
p  re/ft  but also  by  the probability of acquiring  the funds  (1- P  nf)  and by  the  level  of 
reorganisation costs.  Those costs are assumed to be non-firm specific, fixed and equal to 6 
C.  The total expected reorganisation costs (TER) for each type of firm  depends on the 
investor's beliefs on the firm's type and the amount of revaluation: 
(3) 
The total expected reorganisation costs depends on the probability that funds are 
provided (1- p nf (St)) or not (p  nf (St)). In the first case the probability that a reorganisation 
is faced that costs C, is smaller (p re/ft(st>R)C < p re/nf  (R)C). 
Compared  to  other  accounting  methods,  the  revaluation  decision  need not be 
discrete (FIFO or LIFO, linear or accelerated depreciation) but can be continuous up to a 
maximum level M: firms not only have to decide whether or not to revalue the assets but 
also to determine the amount of revaluation. In a complete information environment as 
the amount of revaluation increases, the expected reorganisation costs decrease, and all 
firms  have an incentive to  revalue assets to  minimize the total expected reorganisation 
costs  TER.  It  is  straightforward  to  show  that  the  first  order  derivative  of the  total 
reorganisation costs with respect to R is negative. (d TER/d R=-b/D*TER <0)  Therefore, 
all firms have an incentive to revalue assets by the maximum amount of M (See Figure 
1).  The classical  contractual  hypothesis  in  a  complete  information  environment can 
likewise be identified: the lower is the equity-to-debt ratio of a firm,  E/D, the steeper the 
decline in expected reorganisation costs due to R (given that d TER/d E/D < 0 ). 7 
pie (St,  R) 
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Figure 1 : the effect of a revaluation on the probability of a reorganisation 
In an incomplete information environment, the successful firms can only reveal 
their type by choosing a smaller amount of revaluation (Rl < M). If investors observe a 
smaller amount of revaluation in  a  separating equilibrium,  they correctly update  their 
beliefs that it is a successful firm, SH,  For the firm of type H, the probability of receiving 
funds  increases.  As  a  smaller amount of revaluation results  in  a  larger probability of 
raising the funds,  the expected cash flows  increase by  sH*(e,a(FJD+\)_e-a(FJD+  SH\  As  the 
cash flows realised are larger for the successful firm, those firms gain more by choosing a 
smaller amount of revaluation. 
At the  same  time,  the  amount  of revaluation  influences  the  level  of expected 
reorganisation costs. If a firm revalues the assets by a smaller amount,  the probability of 
receiving funds increases, which decreases the level of reorganisation costs. However, the 
choice of a smaller amount of revaluation results in a weaker financial position, which 
increases  the  level of expected reorganisation costs.  As  proposition  1 in the  appendix 
shows, the choice of a smaller amount of revaluation, Rl < M, results in a net increase in 
the expected reorganisation costs. 
Since  the  probability  of a  reorganisation  is  a  decreasing  convex  function  of 
success,  the  choice of a  smaller amount of revaluation  (Rl  < M) results  in  a  larger 
increase in the probability of reorganising and hence in the expected reorganisation costs 
for the unsuccessful firm (see Figure 1). The proof is in proposition 2 of the appendix. 8 
When the unsuccessful firm  chooses a smaller amount of revaluation it faces  a 
lower increase in expected cash flows  and a larger increase in  expected reorganisation 
costs as  compared to  a successful firm.  A separating outcome where the successful firm 
chooses a smaller amount of revaluation than an unsuccessful firm can be a sequential 
equilibrium, where neither type of firm has an incentive to deviate and investor's beliefs 
are  consistent.  The unsuccessful  firm  will  choose  the  value  maximising  amount of 
revaluation  M,  while  the  successful  firm  selects  the  amount  of revaluation,  which 
maximises its  expected cash flows  and still  avoids  imitation by  the unsuccessful firm. 
Proposition 3 in the appendix derives the optimal amount of revaluation for the successful 
firm: 
Due to  asymmetric information the successful firm  can only reveal its  type by 
choosing an amount of revaluation, R * sufficiently smaller than M, that the unsuccessful 
firms cannot imitate. 
It is important to note that any revaluation amount smaller than R * can also result 
in a separating equilibrium.  But in this  case the successful firm is  not maximising its 
expected profits.  As shown in the appendix, a dichotomous choice, where a successful 
firm would choose to  not revalue at all,  while the unsuccessful  firm  would choose to 
revalue the maximum amount M,  can be a sequential equilibrium, if the expected cash 
flows of the successful firm SH are sufficiently large. 
For the empirical analysis it is important to study which characteristics influence 
the probability of a reaching a separating equilibrium, as  well as  the optimal amount of 
revaluation chosen by  the firms.  One characteristic that determines the net benefits of 
signalling is the difference in expected cash flows between the good and the bad types.  If 
the  difference  between  the  cash  flows  of the  successful  and  the  unsuccessful  firm 
increases, both types of firms gain more from revaluing the assets by a smaller amount: 
not  only  does  the  increase  in  expected  cash  flows  from  signalling  increase,  but  the 
increase in expected reorganisation costs decrease (see proposition 4 in the appendix). 
Therefore, in industries with large differences in performance the amount of revaluation 
chosen by the successful firms, R * must be smaller to avoid imitation by the unsuccessful 
firms.  The proof of this can be found in proposition 4 in appendix.  Further, it can be 9 
shown that the increase in expected cash flows is larger for the successful firm, while the 
increase in expected reorganisation costs is lower than for unsuccessful firms.  Hence, the 
probability of establishing a separating equilibrium increases with  a larger variance in 
expected  performance,  an  empirically  testable  hypothesis.  The  more  distinct  is  the 
successful firm,  the more incentive it will  have to  differentiate himself from other less 
successful firms in the industry, which he can do by revaluing less. 
The initial equity-to-debt ratio, which the model assumes to be type-independent, 
likewise influences the costs and benefits of revaluing less as  signalling device. As  the 
initial  equity-to-debt  ratio  is  higher,  the  increase  in  the  expected  cash  flows  from 
signalling becomes less important.  Hence, revaluing less to signal success becomes less 
attractive.  But at the same time, a higher equity-to-debt ratio leaves a smaller increase in 
expected reorganisation costs due to  signalling, making signalling less  costly.  As  the 
signalling cost and the signalling revenue have confounding effects, no precise outcome 
can be given.  Also the effect on R * is ambiguous  (see proposition 5 in  the appendix). 
However, for the successful firm the signalling revenue reduction effect is larger and the 
cost-dampening effect is smaller than for the unsuccessful firm. This means that for fewer 
combinations of SH  and  SL  a  separating equilibrium can be reached.  Consequently,  in 
industries with higher equity-to-debt ratios, revaluing less as  a signalling device used by 
the successful firm becomes less likely. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A  sample  of Belgian  industrial  companies  IS  selected  to  test  a  number  of 
hypotheses  originating  from  the  theoretical  model.  The  analysis  focuses  on  three 
industries  :  chemicals,  metals  and  construction.  2  For  those  industries,  firms  which 
reported their assets in 1989 are included in the sample, resulting in a total number of 224 
companies: 65  in  the chemical industry, 96 in  the metal industry and 63  in  the building 
industry.  The total number of revaluations equals 45, which is  2%  of the population, a 
relatively  low  percentage.  The  non-revaluers  are  randomly  chosen  from  the  industry 
2  The industries included are: the production and preliminary processing of metals (nace 22), the extraction 
of minerals other than metalleferious and energy-producing minerals, peat extraction (nace 23), manufacture 
of non-metallic mineral products (nace 24), chemical industry (nace 25), the manufacture of pharmaceutical 
products, manufacture of soap, synthetic detergents, perfume and toilet preparation (nace 257 and nace 258), 
manufacutre of metal articles (nace 31), mechanical engineering (nace 32), manufacture of office machinery 
and data processing machinery (nace 33), electrical engineering (nace 34), manufacture of motor vehicles 
and motor vehicles parts (nace 35), manufacture of other means of transport (nace 36), instrument 
engineering (nace 37) and building industry (nace 50). 10 
while respecting the relative occurrence of the industry in the economy3.  Only consistent 
non-revaluers are retained: firms, which did not revalue in  1989, but did so previously in 
1988 are not included in the class of non-revaluers. The data source consists of the annual 
accounts published. 
Besides signalling motives for (not) revaluing, the influence of contracting costs 
are included in the empirical analysis.  First the hypotheses and variables are presented, 
after which the results are reported. 
4.1 Hypotheses 
The  theoretical  model  presented  above,  generates  a  number  of  signalling 
hypotheses  that  can be  tested  empirically.  A  critical  variable  determining  the use  of 
revaluation as a signalling device is the expected success of the firm.  A first problem is 
how to measure (expected) success. Since most of the firms  are not listed on the stock 
exchange, the market-to-book value can not be used as a measure of success. Because the 
market to book value is determined by the cash flows realised, the ratio of cash flows  4 
over fixed assets is chosen to proxy success, where the fixed assets are measured before 
revaluation.s  Given that the cash flow series show a high correlation over time, current 
cash flows can proxy for expected success. 
As  the  theoretical  section  detailed,  the  characteristics  of the  industry  have  a 
significant impact on the incentives to  signal success. A separating equilibrium is  more 
likely to be reached in industries with a high variance in performance. This results in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hi: In  industries with a high variance in performance successful firms are  less 
likely to revalue assets than unsuccessful firms. 
Similarly, the equity-to-debt ratio influences the incentive to use revaluation as a 
signalling device.  Although it is  theoretically unclear whether firms  are  more or less 
likely to revalue in industries with high equity-to-debt ratios, the model predicts that in 
industries where the equity-to-debt ratio is larger, successful firms are less likely to signal 
their success by revaluing less. 
H2: In industries with low equity-to-debt ratios, successful firms are less likely to 
revalue assets than unsuccessful firms. 
3  This sample selection was necessary to reduce the set of firms from 9000 to a more manageable number. 
4 If  the term 'cash flows' is used in the text, these are the  cash flows from operations. 
5 This ratio is preferred over cash flows to equity, since equity is distorted by past performance and dividend 
policy. 11 
Besides these signalling hypotheses  the influence of the traditional motives for 
revaluation,  such  as  legal  requirements  and  other  contractual  relationships  is  also 
examined (Watts &  Zimmerman, 1990). This allows us to test, whether after allowing for 
these  classical  factors,  signalling  has  incremental  value  in  explaining  the  choice  to 
revalue assets. 
The legal requirement that the net worth must be larger than half of the amount of 
capital  provided by  the owners  can  be an  incentive to  revalue  assets.  Introducing the 
impact of legal  covenants,  firms  are  more  likely  to  revalue  assets  if they  violate  the 
covenant.  For  firms  close  to  the  legal  covenant,  as  their  net  worth  decreases,  the 
probability of a reorganisation increases. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H3:lf a firm violates the legal requirement or is close to violation, the probability 
of  a revaluation increases as the net worth of  these firms becomes smaller. 
For firms which have a large net worth and where the probability of violation is 
small, H3  is irrelevant. Hence, for firms not close to violation, changes in the net worth 
should not influence their decision to revalue. 
Empirical studies do not agree on the effectiveness of a covenant itself rather than 
a proxy (Brown et aI.,  1992; Peasnell,  1994;  Beneish and Press,  1995).  Because net 
worth is determined by the level of retained earnings and the undistributed profits 6, the 
ratio  (retained  earnings  + undistributed  profits)/total  assets  can  serve  as  a  proxy  for 
measuring the closeness to the legal covenant. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H4:  As the  (retained  earnings  +  undistributed profits)/Jotal  assets  increases, 
firms are less likely to revalue assets. 
The  introduction  of the  legal  covenant  variables  simultaneously  includes  the 
influence of debt contracts on the revaluation decision. For firms with large reserves and 
retained earnings, the possibility of violating debt covenants is smaller 7. 
Not only the amount of debt but also the composition of debt in the firm could 
influence the decision to  revalue assets.  An interesting hypothesis  is  whether the non-
revaluation is more effective with banks than other debt holders. 
H5: As the share of  the debt owed to banks increases, firms are morelless likely to 
revalue their assets 
6  Undistributed profits are the profits realized in the current period but not distributed, while retained 
earnings are the undistributed profits of the previous periods.  . 
7 The debt/equity ratio can not be added directly because of the high correlation with other independent 
variables. 12 
Firms  with  larger  investments  in  fixed  and  financial  assets  have  more 
opportunities to revalue. As in other studies (Brown et al;, 1992; Peasnell, 1994), the ratio 
(fixed tangible + financial assets)ltotal assets is introduced to control for this effect. 
H6:  As the  investment in financial  and fixed assets  increases, firms  are more 
likely to revalue assets 
To measure the political visibility of firms  two  alternatives  are  available:  sales 
and  the seller concentration in  the industry as  proxied by the Herfindahl index.  Other 
variables are less suitable in this environment. As the revaluation of assets does not affect 
taxes, the tax rate can not be used as an explanatory variable.  The idea is that larger firms 
or  firms  in  more  concentrated  industries  have  a  larger  incentive  to  revalue,  which 
decreases reported income and hence diminishes political visibility.  Size is also used in 
other studies  (Peasnell,  1994;Brown et al.  1992)  where it is  proxying other influences 
such as experience with opportunities offered for creative accounting by the accounting 
law.  Therefore,  both  size  and  the  Herfindahl  index  are  introduced in  the  model. This 
results in the following hypotheses: 
H7: Larger firms are 11wre likely to revalue assets 
H8: Firms in highly concentrated industries are more likely to revalue assets 
The following  table  summarizes  the  explanatory  variables  and  their  expected 
signs.  Two  dependent  variables  are  used:  the  discrete  choice  to  revalue  and  the 
continuous  choice  of  the  magnitude  of  revaluation.  For  the  discrete  choice,  a 
dichotomous (0,1) variable is created that takes the value of 1 if the firm revalues, and 0 
otherwise.  For the continuous choice, the amount of revaluation as  a % of total assets 
before revaluation is used. 13 
Table 1: Description of the variables and the hypotheses 
Variable  Description  Hypothesis  Expected 
sign 
C~ompany  level 
l=industry level 
CFIFA  C  Cash flows/ (fixed assets before revaluation) 
DVH  A dummy if the variance in performance 
in the industry is high; otherwise 0 8; 
DVL  A dummy if the variance in performance 
in the industry is low; otherwise 0; 
CFDVH  C  CFIFA*DVH : The CFIFA in industries with 
a high variance in performance  HI 
CFDVL  C  CFIFA*DVL: The CFIFA in industries with  HI  0 
a low variance in performance 
DDH  A dummy if  the equity-to-debt ratio in the industry 
is high, otherwise zero 9 
DDL  A dummy if the equity-to-debt ratio in the industry 
is low, otherwise zero 
CFDDH  C  CFIFA*DDH; The CFIFA in industries with  H2  0 
a high equity-to-debt ratio 
CFDDL  C  CFIFA*DDL: The CFIFA in industries with  H2 
a low equity-to-debt ratio 
RESITA  C  (Reserves + retained earnings  )/total assets before 
revaluation;  H4 
DLAWA  C  The closeness to the covenant expressed as 
(the net worth /the amount of capital -1) for firms, 
which have a net worth larger than the amount of capital 10; 11;  H3  0 
DLAWB  C  The closeness to the covenant expressed as 
(the net worth/the amount of capital -1) for firms, 
which have a net worth smaller than the amount of capital;  H3 
S  C  Sales realized in the period;  H7  + 
HF  I  The Herfindahl index on a two digit industry level  H8  + 
FFAITA  C  (Tangible fixed + financial assets before revaluation)/ 
total assets before revaluation;  H6  + 
DOB  C  Debt owed to banks/ total debt;  H5  ? 
4.2 Results 
Before presenting the regression results, a few univariate tests are presented. 
3.3.1 Univariate tests 
x The variance in performance is determined on a 2 digit industry level. Several critical values were tried. 
The best results were generated with high defined to be larger than 350. The variance in performance is high 
for sector 31, 32, 34, 35, 36 and 50. 
9 The equity-to-debt ratio is low if it is smaller than 0.32. This situation occurs for sector 25,33,37 and 50. 
10 The legal covenant demands that the net worth is larger than half of the capital. A higher level of capital is 
chosen for the determination of the dummy to include the firms close to covenant default. 
11  The closeness to the covenant is expressed as a quotient to eliminate the influence of size. 14 
As  these financial ratios are not normally distributed, the non-parametric Terry 
Hoeffding  test  is  used  to  identify  any  possible  difference  in  financial  ratios  between 
companies that choose to revalue and those companies not revaluing.  12  The results of 
this univariate test are shown in table 2. 
Table 2: 
The results from the univariate Terry Hoeffding test 
Deviation from Deviation from p-value 
Mean score  Mean score 
non-revaluers  revaluers 
n=179  n=45 
CFDVH  0.079  -0.31  0.0152 
CFDVL  0.029  -0.12  0.3048 
CFDDH  0.024  -0.093  0.4643 
CFDDL  0.091  -0.362  0.0019 
DLAWA  0.135  -0.533  0.0001 
DLAWB  0.130  -0.514  0.0001 
RES/TA  0.158  -0.628  0.0001 
FFAITA  -0.014  0.056  0.6647 
DOB  0.005  -0.021  0.8678 
S  -0.018  0.071  0.5864 
The  univariate  tests  suggest  that  the  industry  characteristics  influence  the 
possibility  to  signal  success  by  non-revaluation  of assets.  In  industries  with  a  high 
variance  in  performance,  non-revaluers perform  significantly  better than  the  revaluers 
while  in  industries  with  a  low  variance  in  performance,  no  significant  variance  in 
performance between the two types can be found. Likewise, the importance of the equity-
to-debt ratio is illustrated. In industries with a low equity-to-debt ratio, the non-revaluers 
perform  significantly  better  than  the  revaluers.  This  difference  doesn't  show  up  in 
industries with a high equity-to-debt ratio. 
12 The Terry Hoeffding test is preferred above other non-parametric tests because it asymptotically has the 
same power as a t-test for normally distributed variables. The chance that the null hypothesis is rejected if it 
may not be rejected is smaller than when other non-parametric tests are used. 15 
Similarly  along  the  closeness  to  the  legal  covenant  dimension,  both  types  of 
companies perform differently.  Non-revaluers have a higher net worth, expressed as  a 
share of their capital, as compared to revaluers.  This holds irrespective of whether firms 
are close to the legal covenant or not. The influence of covenants is also confirmed by the 
significance of the variable RES/T  A.  Retained earnings are higher for the non-revaluing 
firms. 
Finally, none of the share of debt owed to banks, the relative importance of fixed 
and  financial  assets,  nor  the  size  of the  firm  is  significantly  different  between  the 
revaluers and the non-revaluers. 
Interestingly, a significant difference was found in the increase in cash flows  13 
after the revaluation decision between the revaluers and non-revaluers.  Those firms that 
choose not to  revalue in 1989, experience a significantly higher increase in cash flows 
from 1989 to  1990, as compared to firms that did choose to revalue: The deviation from 
the mean score for non-revaluers is  0.11,  while for  the non-revaluers this is  -0.531, a 
difference  that is  highly  significant (p=.0003).  These results  could be  interpreted as 
showing  consistency  in  the  use  of non-revaluation  of assets  as  a  positive  signal  of 
expected success, or that signalling helps to improve the expected rate of success: firms 
abstaining from revaluation not only perform better in this period but also in the next 
period.  However, without controlling for other determining factors, these results might 
simply reflect a time trend in successfullness.14 
3.3.2 Multivariate tests 
In  the  multivariate  analysis  the  joint  power  of the  independent  variables  in 
explaining the revaluation decision is tested. First, the discrete choice problem is studied. 
As the dependent variable is a discrete (I,O)-variable and the dependent variables are not 
normally distributed, a logistic regression is used. The results are shown in table 3. Also 
included in this table are the OLS  results for the the amount of revaluation, which is  a 
continuous dependent variable.  (Model 11 ) 
13  The increase in cash flows is defined as 
DCASH= (cash flows 90-cash flow 89)/cash flows 89. 
14 Ideally, the variable DCASH , which express the incremental increase in cashflows, should be treated as 
dependent variable.  This however requires an indepth study of performance determinants, among which 
signalling is but one.  This clearly moves beyond the scope of the study reported here. DCASH as 
independent variable in the decision to revaluate or not is avoided because of obvious simultaneity problems. 
The increase in cash flows can be the result from identification as a successful firm in this period. 16 
Model (1)  includes the basic signalling and contracting motives for revaluation. 
The results indicate that successful firms are not always found to signal their success by 
not revaluing their assets.  In industries with a high variance in performance, it is more 
rewarding for successful firms  to reveal their true type by signalling. The coefficient of 
CFDVH  is  negative  and  significant,  while  the  coefficient  of CFDVL  is  not.  Hence, 
signalling by successful firms through not-revaluing the assets is only found in industries 
with a high variance in performance, consistent with Hl.  That signalling motives can 
explain firm's decisions to revalue or not, is  not only shown by the significance of the 
coefficients,  at least for  CFDVH,  but also  by the higher R2  as  compared to  model  (4), 
where these variables are lacking.:  15 
Law  also  has  an  important influence on  the  decision  to  revalue assets.  Firms, 
which are close to the covenant default or violate the covenant are more likely to revalue 
assets as their net worth shrinks. This is shown by the significantly negative coefficient of 
DLA  WB in model (1), consistent with H3. The smaller and less significant coefficient of 
DLA  W A confirms that changes in the net worth are less relevant for firms, which are not 
close to covenant default. Finally, the variable sales has a significant positive coefficient, 
consistent with H7 that large firms are more likely to revalue. The insignificance of the 
Herfindahl  index  might  reflect  that  size  is  rather  measuring  other  important  factors 
besides political visibility, such as  a knowledge about the opportunities offered by the 
accounting law. 
As  the  univariate  tests  already  revealed,  the  decision  to  revalue  assets  is  not 
influenced by  the relative importance of fixed  and financial  assets,  nor by the relative 
amount of debt owed to banks.  Dropping these variables from the model doesn't change 
the reported results16.  That all  the variables in model (1) are relevant in explaining the 
revaluation decision is,  besides the reported R2  is  also  illustrated by  the apparent error 
rate. If each observation is classified using the model, only 17.85 % of the observations is 
misclassified  17. 
To  confirm the  results from HI, a split regression is  reported for the industries 
with a high variance in performance (model 2, DVH=l, n=149) and for the industries with 
15  The R2 for these logistic models are calculated through (-2Iog(intercept only)-2Iog(intercept & 
covariates»/-2Iog(intercept only) (see Cramer (1991». 
16 Multicollinearity is not an important problem for the results, as the correlation matrix, see Appendix, 
demonstrates. The largest correlation exists between DOB and FFAITA and equals -0.39155. 
17  Large differences exist between the results for each sector. The model gives the best results for the 
construction industry (15.87 %) and the worst results for the metal industry (19.79 % ). The error rate for the 
chemical industry equals 16.92 %. 17 
a low variance in performance (model 3, DVL=l, n=75). As expected, the variable CFIFA 
is only significant when the variance in performance in the industry is high. This confirms 
again that the performance of the other firms in the industry determines the decision by 
successful  firms  to  signal  their  success  through  not  revaluing  assets.  Furthermore,  if 
signalling by the non-revaluation of assets does not occur, in casu in those industries with 
a low variance in performance, other contractual relationships become more relevant. As 
the fixed and financial assets are more important in the financial statements, a revaluation 
is more likely to occur. Also larger firms are more likely to revalue assets. 
To further zero in on the contracting hypotheses, the legal covenant itself, (the net 
worth -half of the capital), is introduced in model 6 instead of a higher covenant, (the net 
worth - the amount of capital).  Since both variables, DLAW  A'  and DLA  WB', have the 
opposite results in terms of significance as  compared to  modell, the results  seem to 
suggest that firms which are close to,  but not yet facing,  the legal covenant default are 
most likely to revalue their assets when their net worth decreases. Those firms have a net 
worth between half and the full amount of capital. 
In  model 5  the covenant itself is  replaced by  the proxy for  the  self financing 
capacity of the firm. This model has a somewhat higher % of rnisclassified observations 
than the basic model (18.75%  > 17.85%), which  suggests  that the covenant itself is  a 
better measure than the proxy. All the other variables which are significant in modell, 
remain significant, indicating a degree of robustness of these results. 
To further check the  robustness  of the  results,  the firms,  which revalued their 
assets  in  the  previous year but not in  the  current year  are  added to  the  group  of the 
revaluers in model 9 instead of being deleted from the sample in model 1 (n=18). All the 
basic results remain, although the variable sales no longer is significant. The Herfindahl 
index is  deleted in  model 7.  Comparing the performance of this  model with  the basic 
model (1) shows that political visibility to escape regulation is certainly not a main issue Table 3: The results from the multivariate tests 
model I  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5  model 6  model 7  model 8  model 9  model 10  model  II 
intercept  -0.9434  -01910  -3.2065  -1.3085  -0.7954  -0.7904  -1.0591  -0.8184  -1.0612  -1.8834  -0.00090 
(0.0177)  (0.1528)  (0.0218)  (0.0002)  (0.0372)  (0.0447)  (0.0046)  (0.0476)  (0.0071)  (0.0029)  (0.9311 ) 
CF  -1.1334  -0.004 
(0.0211)  (0.9941) 
CFDVH  -0.6977  - - -0.7905  -0.8126  -0.6816  -0.7274  -0.7063  -0.002042 
(0.0905)  - - (0.0487)  (0.0465)  (0.0930)  (0.0771)  (0.0940)  (0.7142) 
CFDVL  -0.2159  - - -0.2708  -0.2123  -0.2304  -0.1852  -0.2306  0.008401 
(0.4399)  - - (0.3255)  (0.4484)  (0.4070)  (0.4967)  (0.4495)  (0.2814) 
s  l.2IE-7  -5.26E-8  1. 88E-7  1.27E-7  1. 22E-7  L15E-7  +1.04E-7  1.32E-7  L16E-8  l.22E-7  -1.23E-9 
(0.0309)  (0.8017)  (0.0199)  (0.0237)  (0.0247)  (0.0381)  (0.0445)  (0.0203)  (0.5842)  (0.0404)  (0.4497) 
FFAfIA  0.4343  -2.2318  5.6976  0.8415  0.3422  0.5248  0.2254  0.4594  0.3152  0.2906  0.063807 
(0.6768)  (0.1483)  (0.0125)  (0.4060)  (0  (0.6143)  (0.8234)  (0.6600)  (0.7584)  (0.7835)  (0.0263) 
.7402) 
DOB  -1.7629  -0.6393  -3.7710  -1.7768  -2.0108  -1.7002  -1.7708  -1.8550  -1.8480  -1.8444  -0.066523 
(0.1395)  (0.6924)  (0.0867)  (0.1335)  (0.0905)  (0.1491)  (0.1388)  (0.1211)  (0.1102)  (0.7835)  (0.0198) 
DLAWA  -0.0820  -0.1242  -0.0616  -0.0866  -0.0831  -0.0895  -0.0781  -0.0852  -0.000082 
(0.1022)  (0.1331)  (0.4543)  (0.0922)  (0.1028)  (0.0823)  (0.1200)  (0.1030)  (0.6999) 
DLAWB  -0.9054  -0.2279  -3.7780  -1.2477  -0.8956  -0.9695  -0.7850  -1.0417  -0.038370 
(0.0533)  (0.6979)  (0.1727)  (0.0063)  (0.0572)  (0.0319)  (0.0674)  (0.0239)  (0.0001) 
RESrrA  -2.2389 
(0.0040) 
DLAWA'  -0.0498 
(0.0720) 
DLAWB'  -0.4525 
(0.1247) 
TECH  -1.0678 
(0.0404) 
CFDDH  -0.1564 
(0.5191) 
CFDDL  -1.3066 
(0.0272) 
HF  -2.0173  1.9086  -3.4678  -2.0247  -1.9210  -2.0322  -3.0410  0.0285  -0.8068  0.048183 
(0.4110)  (0.5586)  (0.5534)  (0.4059)  (0.4206)  (0.4023)  (0.2371)  (0.9898)  (0.7393)  (0.4436) 
R2  16.12 %  15.67%  38.79%  14.22 %  14.55 %  15.44%  15.80%  17.61%  13.38 %  18.13 %  17.80% 
-21og intercept  223.832  148.767  75.611  223.832  223.832  223.832  223.832  223.832  231.637  223.637 
-21og intercept  187.361  125.499  45.665  191.994  191.268  188.888  188.050  184.037  200.639  182.847 
and covariates 
n  224  149  75  224  224  224  224  224  240  224  224 
misclassifica- 17.85 %  17.44 %  13.33 %  18.30 %  18.75 %  17.86 %  18.75%  17.41 %  16.04 %  18.30% 
tion rate 
--- _. ---- ------- ------- ---19 
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Another result from the theoretical model is that a separating equilibrium is more 
likely to be reached in industries with a low equity-to-debt level. This problem is studied 
in model 8.  19  As in the basic model, the influence of success on the decision to revalue 
assets is analyzed for industries with a low as compared to a high equity-to-debt  level. As 
the  variable  CFDDH  does  not  have  a  coefficient  significantly  different  from  zero, 
successful firms are not more likely to reveal their type in industries with a high equity-
to-debt ratio. This contrasts with industries where the equity-to-debt ratio is low. In those 
circumstances,  successful  firms  have  a  vested interest in  not revaluing their  assets  to 
reveal true types,  as  the significantly negative coefficient of CFDDL shows,  consistent 
with H2. 
Bar-Yosef et al. (1995, p60-61) put forward the idea that signalling is more likely 
to occur in industries with high levels of R&D expenditures.  As more uncertainty exists 
about  the  success  of those  R&D  activities,  signalling  is  more  important  in  those 
industries. To test this in the context of revaluation, a dummy TECH is added to model 
10, which equals 1 for industries with high R& D-to-sales ratios2o. As the variable TECH 
has a significantly negative coefficient, a revaluation of assets is less likely to  occur in 
high-tech industries. All this confirms that firms have more incentives to reveal their type 
in  high  tech industries  where  asymmetry  in  information on  company  success  is  more 
predominant.  Including the interaction with successfullness fails to establish a significant 
effect, indicating that all firms, not just the more successfull firms have a higher incentive 
to not revalue in these industries.  21 
LX  Some other variables were added to modell, but not reported. To measure the concern of the firm about 
changes in its financial structure, DEBTV  AR, the amount of debt increase in the last year,  is added to model 
1. As the increase in debt did not show up with a significant coefficient (p=0.8291), the change in financial 
structure does not seem to influence the decision to revalue assets.  Finally, a dummy equaling 1 if the 
number of employees is larger than 50, i.e. companies which by law have to organize employee councils, is 
introduced. When a firm has to report its results to an employee council, it might have an extra incentive to 
revalue fixed assets. If  assets are revalued, they can be depreciated, which decreases reported income, which 
in tum can soften wage demands by the employees.  However, also this dummy failed to have a significant 
coefficient (p=0.3264). 
LY Including both industry characteristics, variance in performance and equity-to-debt ratio, was not possible, 
given that CFDDL turned out to be a linear combination of CFDDH, CFDVH and CFDVL.  Hence, both 
characteristics had to be tested separately. 
20 The industries with high R&D expenditures are 25, 257 and 258, 33 and 34. 
2L  It should be added that the significantly negative coefficient of this variable is mainly due to the sectors 
257(pharmaceuticals) and 258(cosmetics). 20 
Finally, rather than the decision on whether or not to  revalue assets,  the actual 
amount of revaluation  (as  a  %  of total  assets  before  revaluation)  is  taken  to  be the 
dependent  variable  in  model  11.  The  OLS  results  show  that  in  contrast  with  the 
dichotomous decision to revalue assets, where evidence of signalling by successful firms 
was found  at least in some circumstances, no  such evidence prevails for  the amount of 
revaluation.  As  the variable CFDVH does  not have a coefficient significantly different 
from zero,  successful firms  are not significantly revaluing less,  even if the variance in 
performance within their industry is large.  Hence, these results suggest that in industries 
with a high variance in performance, successful firms do engage in signalling, but they 
use  as  the  signal  forbearance  of the  revaluation  option  rather  than  to  revalue  less. 
Although this dichotomous choice is a more costly signal for them, it has the advantage 
that it can be more clearly interpreted by the receivers and hence may prove to be a more 
effective signal. There are also other remarkable results. While the decision to revalue 
assets  was  not  determined by  the  importance  of the fixed  and  financial  assets  in  the 
balance  sheet,  companies  that have  a  higher  share  of fixed  and  financial  assets  will 
revalue a significantly larger share of these assets, as the significantly positive coefficient 
ofFFAITA in model (11) demonstrates.  Also debt owed to banks shows up significantly 
(p-value of 0.0198).  The amount of revaluation is lower for companies where the share 
of debt  owed  to  banks  is  higher.  Firms  apparently  take  into  account  that  it is  more 
difficult to  mislead banks,  as  compared to  other users of the financial  statements. The 
hypothesis for the legal covenant is also confirmed. The legal convenant is only important 
for firms which are (close to)  violating the legal requirements.  Only for these firms,  as 
the net worth decreases, firms  are more likely to revalue assets.  While the size of the 
firm  determined  the  decision  to  revalue  assets,  it  does  not  influence  the  amount  of 
revaluation as a percentage of assets (p-value of 0.4497). 
5. Conclusions 
The signalling function of non-revaluation of assets is studied in an environment, 
where the probability of raising investment funds depends on the firm's current financial 
position as  well as the expected success of its projects.  As the non-revaluation of assets 
results  in  decrease  of the  net  worth,  the  probability  of violating  the  minimum  legal 
covenant with  respect ot the net  worth  increases. Therefore,  non-revaluation of assets 
results in an increase of the expected reorganisation costs.  At the same time however, the 
probability  of receiving  funds  can  increase  when  abstaining  from  revalution,  when 21 
investors believe non-revaluers to  be more successful.  A separating equilibrium, where 
only  the successful firms  do  not revalue assets,  can be reached because the  signalling 
costs, the increase in expected reorganisation costs, is smaller and the signalling revenue, 
the increase in the expected cash flows is larger for the successful firms. Large variance 
in performance within the industry as well as a low equity-to-debt level were shown to be 
more favorable conditions for signalling by successful firms. 
Testing these hypotheses on Belgian data revealed that the use of revaluation as a 
signalling device is restricted.  Only in industries with a large variance in performance or 
sufficiently low equity-to-debt ratios were more successful firms found to have a higher 
probability of not revaluing their assets.  While no  significant effect was found on the 
amount of revaluation, the decision to not revalue assets seems to be an efficient signal 
for  successful  firms,  rather  than  the  amount  of revaluation.  The impact of a  firm's 
success  on  the  incentives  to  revalue  persist even  if classical  contracting motives  are 
included in the empirical analysis.  Firms, which violate the legal convenant or are close 
to  covenant violation are  more likely to  revalue assets  when  their net worth is  lower, 
while those which are not close to covenant default, are not more likely to revalue when 
their net worth decreases. 
The results reported here should not be interpreted as  suggesting that signalling 
motives are crucial in the revaluation decision.  Without any direct assessment of motives 
for revaluation , the use of cash flows  to test the signalling hypotheses calls for a more 
cautious stance when interpreting the results.  Other reasons why firms with higher cash 
flows are less likely to revalue cannot be excluded.  The main contribution of the paper is 
in theoretically identifying the circumstances in which signalling by successful firms may 
be  more  powerful.  In  addition,  the  results  are  interesting  in  their  ability  to  indicate 
avenues  for  further  research.  The  different  results  for  the  dichotomous  versus  the 
continuous  revaluation  choice  should  lead  to  a  conclusion  that  when  firms  want  to 
eliminate  asymmetric  information,  they  are  clearly  considering  the  efficiency  of 
signalling devices,  trading off the net (opportunity) cost of using the signal versus  the 
impact on the investors' beliefs, where the latter may be specific for the type of investor, 
eg banks versus other agents.  However, more theoretical and empirical work should be 
done  on  the  choice of signalling  device,  extending  the  scope  of instruments  to  other 
accounting devices as well as financial instruments. 
Although robustness was seen within the sample, clearly more empirical work is 
necessary on other samples to  validate the results.  Also more work should be done to 22 
improve the theoretical and empirical assessment of variables included in the explanation 
of the revaluation decision. 23 
APPENDIX 
Proposition  1:  The  revaluation  of assets  results  In  a  decrease  In  the  expected 
reorganisation costs, c.p. 
(A.I) 
From using expression (3) for TER, it can easily be established that LHS of (A.I) is equal 
to  ((l-pnf)exp-bst  +  pnf)*exp-bE/D*(exp-bRJD-exp-bMID).  The  first  two  terms  are 
positive.  Also the last term is negative when R<M. QED. 
Note that the proposition already follows from the fact that aTERJaR<O 
As the amount of revaluation RI decreases, the effect on the deterioration of the financial 
structure is  larger.  As the difference between the cash  flows  increases,  the difference 
between the expected reorganisation costs increases, the successful firm gains more from 
identification as  a  successful firm and the amount of RI  must be smaller to  reach an 
increase in the expected reorganisation costs. 
Proposition 2: The  increase in  the expected reorganisation costs by choosing a smaller 
amount of  revaluation is larger for SL 
The  increase  in  the  expected  reorganisation  costs  by  choosing  a  smaller  amount  of 
revaluation R I < M is larger for the unsuccessful firm when: 
(A.2a) 
Proof:  Again using the expression (3)  for TER, it can easily be established after some 
rearranging that CA.2) corresponds to 
(1  - pnfCSH) 
>  e -b(M - RI)/D  (A.2b) 24 
As pn\SH) is smaller than pnf(SL),  the LHS of (A.3) is certainly larger than 1. The RHS is 
certainly smaller than 1 because M > Rl and e  -bx is  smaller than  1 for all  values of x. 
QED. 
Proposition 3: 
The following configuration is a signalling equilibrium (sequential eqiulibrium): A firm 
of  type t=H chooses RI < M,  while a firm of  type t=L chooses M.  The investors belief  S 
= SH if  they observe R=RI.  If  they observe R=M, S=SL. 
Proof: That the investor's beliefs are rational given the strategies of firms of both types is 
easy to see.  What remains to be established is whether proposition 3 describes an optimal 
strategy  for  firms  of both  types  given  investor's  beliefs,  i.e.  whether  firms  have  no 
incentive to unilaterally deviate. 
A firm of type t=H does not want to deviate from R<M when 
(l_pnf (SH  »*SH - TERH(SH, R)  ;:::  (l_pnf (SL»*SH - TERH(SL, M) 
or 
(pnf(SL) - pnf(SH »*SH  ;:::  TERH(SH, R*) - TERH(SL, M), 
A firm of type t=L does not want to deviate from R=M when 
(l-pnf(sL»*sL - TERL(SL, M)  ;:::  (l_pnf(SH »*SL - TERdsH, R) 
or 
(pn\SH )- pnf(SL»*SL  ;:::  TERL(k, M) - TERdsH' R). 
(A.3a) 
(A.3b) 
Given that R increases expected cash flows, all else equal (see proposition 1), the H-type 
will select the highest level ofrevaluation that still satisfies (A.3b):  The H-type wants to 
select an amount of revaluation as high as possible under the condition that the low firm 
will not mimic its strategy.  This amount of revaluation, R *, can be obtained from (A.3 b) 
that holds with equality. 
After some rearranging, this yields 
(A.3c) 
It still needs to be established that this R * satisfies (A.3a).  From proposition 2 we know 
that the RHS  of (A.3c)  is larger than (TERH  (SH,  R*)  - TERH(SL,  M».  Hence (pn\SL)-
P\(SH»*SL  is  also  larger than TERH(SH,  R*)  - TERH(SL,  M).  With  SH  >  SL,  .(pnf(SL)_ 25 
pnf(SH))*SH  is  a  fortiori  larger than TERH  (SH,  R *)  - TERH(sL,  M),  which corresponds 
precisely with (A.3a) QED 
Condition  A3b  also  shows  that  R *  is  smaller than M.  The LHS  is  negative  because 
(pnf(SH)  <  pnf(SL)).  Therefore,  the  RHS  must  also  be  smaller  than  zero.  Because  the 
expected  reorganisation  costs  are  larger  when  the  investors  believe  that  it  is  an 
unsuccessful firm, R * must be smaller than M to reach a situation, where TERH(sL, M) < 
TERH (SH' R *). 
It is important to note that there are multiple separating equilibria.  In fact all values of 
R<R* chosen by the H-type would satisfy a fortiori (A.3b).  Take for instance the case of 
a dichotomous choice of R=O  by the H-type, while the L-type prefers R=M.  Given that 
the L-type will not mimic a choice of R=O, not revaluing could be a better strategy for the 
H-type than to revalue R=M. 
In order to have condition (A.3a) satisfied with R=O, note that LHS of (A.3a) is 
increasing in SH:  aLFS/a SH = (pnf(sd_ pn\SH)) - SH*apnf (sH)/asH > 0 with  = 
(pnf(sd_ pnf(SH)) > 0 and apnf (sH))/asH  <0.  The RHS of (A.3a) is decreasing in SH: 
while aTERIas < 0, laTERH(sL, M)/asHI  <  laTERH(sH, O)/asHI.  Define  SH + to be 
the level of SH for which (A.3a) holds with equality.  Then with SH> SH +  condition 
(A.3a) will hold. 
Hence with SH large enough, a signalling outcome with the H-type not revaluing, while 
the L-type revalues the maximum amount M, and the investor's belief structure as in 
proposition 3, is a sequential equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: If the  variance  in  performance  in  the  industry  is  larger,  a  separating 
equilibrium,  where the successful firm does  not revalue assets,  is  more easily reached, 
while R *  decreases. 
Define SH  =SL + Ll 
The effect on the signalling revenue of a larger difference between SH and SL is positive: 
(pn\SL) - pnf(SH ))* St = exp-a(E/D+sd(1-exp(-ail))St 
Hence 
a(AAa)/aLl=a  *(  exp(  -aLl)) *exp-a(E/D+sd, 
which is positive 
(AAa) 
(AAb) 26 
The effect on the increase in TER of a larger difference between SH  and SL is negative: 
TERH (SH, R*) - TERH(SL, M) = 
C*exp-b((E+R)/D+st)*(l-exp-bP/D+ exp-a(E/D+sd*(  exp(  -~)-exp-bP/D» 
where M=R+P  (A.4c) 
Hence 
o(AAc)/o~=-a*C* exp-b((E+R)ID+st)*( exp-a(EID+sd*(exp(  -~)  (A.4d) 
which is negative. 
Since signalling revenue increases while the signalling cost decreases when the difference 
between SH  and SL is higher, signalling by revaluing less, becomes more attractive.  Note 
that this holds for both types.  Since it also holds for the unsuccessful type, it is clear that 
in  order  to  have  a  separating  equilibrium  where  the  low  type  is  not  mimicking  the 
signalling  strategy of the  successful  type,  the  latter needs  to  choose  a  lower level  of 
revaluation  to  prevent  imitation.  Indeed  it  is  straightforward  to  show  that  R *  is 
decreasing in ~: 
From (A.3c) it can be shown that  oR*lo~ <0 given that olnTERL(sH'  R=O)/o~ < 0 
while oln((pnf(sL)-pnf(sH»*sdo~ > 0 and oTERL(SL,  R=M»/o~  = O.  QED 
From  the  expressions  (A.4b)  and  (AAd)  it is  easy  to  see  that  o(AAb  )/ost  > 0  and 
o(AAd)/ost> O.  Hence the increase in signalling revenue from a higher variance is larger 
for the more successful firm.  At the same time, the decrease in signalling cost is higher 
for the more successful firm.  Both effects combined, indicate that signalling becomes 
relatively  more  attractive  for  the  successful  firm  than  for  the  unsuccessful  firm  in 
industries with a higher variance in success. 
Proposition  5:  If the  equity-to-debt  ratio  zn  the  industry  is  higher,  a  separating 
equilibrium,  where  the  successful firm  does  not revalue  assets,  is  less  easily  reached, 
while the effect on R* is undetermined. 
In a similar spirit the effect of the E/D ratio on the likelihood of establishing a separating 
equilibrium can be established. 
The effect on the signalling revenue of a larger EID ratio is negative: 
o(AAa)/oEID=-a*(pnf(SL) - pnf(SH »*St  (A.Sa) 
The effect on the increase in TER of a larger EID ratio is also negative: 27 
a(AAc  )laEID=-b*(AAc) 
-a*(C*exp-b«E+R)ID+st)*exp-a(EID+sd*(exp(-a.6.)-exp-bP/D))  (A.Sb) 
A larger E/D ratio decreases the benefits from signalling.  At the same time, it decreases 
the  costs  of  signalling  for  both  types.  Consequently,  the  total  effect  on  the  net 
profitability of signalling is unclear. 
Given this, it is easy to see that the effect on R  * will also be undetermined. 
From (A.3c) it can be shown that aR*/aEID><O given that alnTERL(sH, R=O)/aE/D < 
o  while aln«pnf(sL)-pnf(sH))*sL)"aEID<O and aTERL(SL, R=M))/aEID < O. 
Again from the expression for (A.Sa) and (A.5b), it is easy to see that a(A.5a)/ast < 0 and 
a(A.5b)/ast> o.  Hence, the decrease in signalling benefits is larger, while the decrease in 
signalling cost is smaller for the successful firm as  compared to  the unsuccessful firm. 
Consequently, a separting equilibrium with the  successful firm signalling becomes less 
likely. 28 
Estimated Correlation Matrix for model 1 
Variable  ICPT  CFDVH  CFDVL  DOB  FFAffA  S  DLawA  DLAWB  HF 
ICPT  1.0  -0.39502  -0.09631  -0.03313  -0.50584  0.02436  -0.21084  0.21015  -0.33749 
CFDVH-0.39502  1.0  0.08133  -0.01160  0.13174  0.05015  -0.04096  -0.33861  0.05236 
CFDVL-0.09631  0.08313  1.00000  0.06007  0.02904  -0.06176  -0.06215  -0.01900  -0.06028 
DOB  -0.03313  -0.01160  0.06007  1.00000  -0.39155  -0.26565  0.01010  0.11143  -0.00309 
FFArrA-0.50584  0.13174  0.02904  -0.39155  1.00000  0.08594  -0.03074  0.05133  -0.23982 
S  0.02436  0.05015  -0.06176  -0.26565  0.08594  1.00000  -0.00145  -0.14902  -0.37189 
DLawA-0.21084  -0.04096  -0.06215  0.01010  0.03074  -0.00145  1.00000  -0.15259  -0.02304 
DLawB  0.21015  -0.33861  -0.01900  0.11143  0.05133  -0.14902  -0.15259  1.00000  0.03857 
HF  -0.33749  0.05236  -0.06028  -0.00309  -0.23982  0.37189  -0.02304  0.03857  1.00000 29 
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